Supplementary material for:

Kukharkin, A., Barber, B., Cooley, E., Caluori, N., Brown, X., Singh, A., Cipolli, W. & Brown-Iannuzzi, J.L. (2026). White Americans' feelings of being "last place" are associated with anti-DEI attitudes, Trump support, and Trump vote during the 2024 U.S. presidential election. *advances.in/psychology, 1*, e549398. https://doi.org/10.56296/aip00046

Supplemental Materials and Analyses

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Additional Measures to Explore Separate Research Questions

As mentioned in the manuscript, we included many additional measures in our longitudinal study given the expense of obtaining responses over time from the same set of non-Hispanic, White Americans who were sampled to be representative of the U.S. via census-based quotas. Likewise, the timing of this study during the 2024 U.S. presidential election season led to our desire to capture data that could answer as many research questions as possible. Because these additional measures were included to address unique hypotheses among our research team, they are briefly mentioned in the main manuscript and then detailed more below.

Additional Measures Included at All 5 Waves.

Defection from Democratic Rules of the Game. This set of three items, taken from McClosky (1964), assessed participants' willingness to part with traditional political methods by asking them to indicate their agreement with statements suggesting a departure from these 'rules of the game' (e.g., "I don't mind a politician's methods if they manage to get the right things done."). This variable was measured on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*).

Attitudes Toward Immigration. In this section, participants first indicated whether they believed the current level of immigration into the U.S. should be increased or decreased on a 1 (*decreased by a lot*) to 5 (*increased by a lot*) scale (adapted from Jones, 2024). They also indicated their support for three policies regarding legal immigration (e.g., "making it harder for legal immigrants to become citizens") and three policies regarding illegal immigration (e.g., "greater U.S. efforts to stop illegal immigration") on 1 (*extremely unsupportive*) to 6 (*extremely supportive*) scales. Policy support items were taken from Perez, 2010.

Attitudes Toward Abortion. This set of six items asked participants to rate their agreement to three stereotypes about abortion recipients (e.g., "women who have abortions are often selfish"; adapted from Cockrill et al., 2013) and to three statements about restrictive abortion policy (e.g., "abortion should be strictly regulated by the government") on a sliding scale (0 = *strongly disagree*, 100 = *strongly agree*).

Personal Relative Deprivation (PRD). This set of two questions asked participants to rate their beliefs of personal relative deprivation based on the initial measure developed by Callan et al., 2008 (e.g. "When I think about what I have compared to others, I feel deprived" and "I feel resentful when I see how prosperous other people seem to be") on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*).

Entitlement. These three items were taken from Campbell et al. (2004) and assessed participant agreement with statements that indicated their feelings of personal economic entitlement (e.g., "I deserve to have opportunities for financial success in my life.") on 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) scales.

White Identification. Participants were then asked to indicate their level of identification with their racial group with two items adapted from Leach et al., (2008) and Sellers et al., (1997): "My White American heritage is an important part of my identity" and "I feel a strong sense of belonging to White Americans" on 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) scales.

Symbolic Racism. Finally, participants rated their agreement to three items assessing symbolic anti-Black racism (e.g., "Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same;" Henry & Sears, 2002) on 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) scales.

Wave-Specific Additional Measures.

Wave 1 (Pre-Election).

There were no additional measures at wave 1 beyond those already reported on in the manuscript.

Wave 2 (Pre-Election).

Presidential Debate Viewing. At wave 2, participants were also asked a yes or no question about whether or not they watched any of the Kamala Harris vs. Donald Trump presidential debate on September 10th (or via clips afterward). If participants answered "yes," they were then asked how much of the debate they watched on a sliding scale (0 = *very little*, 100 = *the whole thing*). Then, participants were asked about how effective they thought each candidate was in the debate on a sliding scale (0 = *not effective at all,* 100 = *extremely effective*).

Political Knowledge and Efficacy. Participants were also asked to rate how knowledgeable they felt about the U.S. political system on a five-point Likert scale (0 = *not at all knowledgeable,* 5 = *extremely knowledgeable).* Then, participants answered how much impact they feel they have on the U.S. political system on a five-point Likert scale (0 = *no impact*, 5 = *a great deal of impact*). Then, we asked two open-ended questions about the potential impact of the election (e.g., "What do you think would happen if Kamala Harris/Donald Trump is elected as president?" and "How would this election influence the state of affairs in the country?") for presidential candidates Kamala Harris and Donald Trump.

Exposure to News Media and its Consumption. Finally, participants were asked a series of questions about their exposure to and consumption of news media. The first question asked, "In the past 7 days, how many days did you watch, read, or listen to the news on TV, radio, printed newspapers, or the Internet, not including sports?" Participants responded on a scale of 0 (*none*) to 7 (*seven days*). Then, participants were asked to select all of the sources they got

political and election news from in the past week (e.g., ABC News, CBS News, CNN, FOX News, NPR, etc.). Then, participants answered the question "Which of these is your main source of news?" with several options (e.g., ABC, CBS, or NBC News, digital or online news, social media or YouTube, FOX news, public television or radio, your local newspaper, etc.). Lastly, participants were asked "What TV news or commentary source do you trust the most?" with similar options as the previous questions (e.g., CNN, MSNBC, FOX News, ABC, NBC, CBS).

Wave 3 (Pre-Election).

Political Engagement. Participants were asked how they would rate their likelihood of getting involved and creating change when it comes to political decisions that they disagree with on a sliding scale from 0 (*not likely at all*) to 100 (*extremely likely*).

Emotion Regulation. Participants responded to six items focused on cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression (e.g., "I control my emotions by not expressing them") on a sliding scale from 0 (*strongly disagree*) to 100 (*strongly agree*) taken from Preece et al., 2023.

Intergroup Anger. In this item, adapted from Halperin et al. (2013), participants were asked to respond to one question about how they felt about the political party they do not associate with (e.g., "To what extent do you feel anger and/or rage towards the members of the political party you do NOT associate yourself with?") on a sliding scale from 0 (*no anger/rage at all*) to 100 (*extreme amount of anger/rage*).

Wave 4 (Post-Election).

Fair Election and Satisfaction. Participants rated their agreement to three items assessing whether the U.S. presidential election was fair (e.g., "I accept the results of the election," "I believe the election was fair," and "The election was free and fair") on a seven-point Likert scale (0 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*). The first two items were adapted from Vail and

Horner, 2023 and the third item was added. Additionally, participants were asked how satisfied they felt with the outcome of the presidential election on a sliding scale (0 = *not at all satisfied,* 100 = *extremely satisfied*).

Emotions About Election Outcome. Participants were asked to rate for 11 items total about to what extent they felt negative emotions (e.g., "helpless," "sad," "depressed," "ready to give up"), positive emotions (e.g., "hopeful," "energized," "optimistic," "inspired"), and angry emotions (e.g., "angry," "ready to fight against the elected administration," "willing to take violent action to challenge the results") when thinking about the election results on a scale from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*extremely*).

Intergroup Anger. See wave 3 above for a full description of this measure.

Emotional Uncertainty. Participants were asked to rate their agreement with two items about emotional uncertainty (e.g., "I feel uneasy when there are big changes in society, like the transition of power after a presidential election;" "I get worried when an important situation, such as a presidential election, is uncertain.") adapted from the highest factor loading items from the Emotional Uncertainty subscale developed by Greco and Roger (2001). Participants rated their agreement with these two items on a five-point Likert scale (0 = *strongly disagree,* 5 = *strongly agree*).

Perceived Control Over Stressful Events. Participants were asked to rate their agreement with two items about their perceived control over stressful events about the outcome of the election (e.g., "I could have done something to prevent the election outcome from happening;" "There are things I can do to reduce the risk that a similar election outcome will happen again.") adapted from Frazier et al. (2011). Participants rated their agreement with these two items on a five-point Likert scale (0 = *strongly disagree*, 5 = *strongly agree*).

Post-Election Well-Being. Participants were asked to indicate how they have been feeling mentally since the election via 5 items taken from the World Health Organization-Five Well-Being Index (WHO-5) (e.g., "I have felt cheerful and in good spirits;" "I have felt calm and relaxed;" "I have felt active and vigorous;" "I woke up feeling fresh and rested;" "My daily life has been filled with things that interest me."). Participants rated each statement on a six-point scale (0 = *at no time*, 6 = *all of the time*).

Wave 5 (Post-Election).

Fair Election and Satisfaction. See wave 4 above for a full description of this measure.

Emotions About Election Outcome. See wave 4 above for a full description of this measure.

Intergroup Anger. See wave 3 above for a full description of this measure.

Traditional Values. Participants were asked to rate their agreement with three items regarding traditional values (e.g., "Donald Trump will help Americans live by traditional values;" "Donald Trump will help families restore traditional gender roles;" "Donald Trump will protect traditional American culture.") on a six-point Likert scale (0 = *strongly disagree*, 6 = *strongly agree*).

Perceived Control Over Stressful Events. See wave 4 above for a full description of this measure.

Election Well-Being. See wave 4 above for a full description of this measure.

Local Involvement. Participants were asked how likely they were to engage in some form of local involvement over the next four years (e.g., "Vote in every local election;" "Call, write, or visit the office of local politicians;" "Participate in a march for a cause you believe in;"

"Canvass (door-knock) to talk to voters about issues and candidates that matter to you.") on a five-point Likert scale (0 = *not at all likely*, 5 = *extremely likely*).

Political Imagination. Participants were asked to respond to an open-ended question about what they think the future of the U.S. will look like during Donald Trump's presidency (e.g., "What do you think will happen to the country and its citizens during the Donald Trump presidency?").

Tests of Within- and Between-Profile Differences

We also conducted tests comparing 1) ratings of each target group across profiles, and 2) ratings of target groups within each profile. We next summarize those results, which map onto the 95% CIs visualized in Figure 2 in the manuscript. Detailed results of these models can be viewed directly at the end of our multi-level model R file on OSF titled "MLM_PosterProbs_4Profile.R".

To compare ratings of each target group between profiles, we fit separate models for each target group where we regressed participants' ratings of that target group on profile (for instance, self-ratings regressed on profile). In three out of five of these models, we found that the "last place (tied)" profile had significantly different ratings of the target group compared to all other profiles (see Table 1S). The only models that showed an exception was the model regressing ratings of Asian participants and White participants on profile. In both models, the "third place-*dispersed*" profile and "last place (tied)" profile did not differ from each other in their average ratings of Asian and White people. Additional pairwise comparisons showed comparisons between average ratings of each racial group across all profiles (see Table 2S). These results map on to the results visually depicted in Figure 2 in the manuscript.

To compare ratings of each target group within each profile, we fit four separate multilevel models, one for each profile. Each model specified a random intercept for participant, and ratings (treated as a repeated measure in a long-format dataset) were regressed on target. We coded target so that people's self-rating was the reference category. Thus, the coefficient for Asian people represents the difference in rating between Asian people and one's self, the coefficient for White people represents the difference in rating between White people and one's self, etc. All comparisons were significant in all models, meaning that participants viewed each

group's status as significantly different than their own status across all profiles (see Table 3S). The one exception was the comparison between the self and Asian people in the "second place (tied)" profile.

Further pairwise contrasts comparing all groups (within each profile) showed more conservative results. These more conservative results are due to the fact that these pairwise contrasts applied Tukey corrections for multiple comparisons. Tukey-adjusted *p*-values did not reach significance for comparisons between the self and Black or between Latinx and Black people in the "last place (tied)" profile, or between Asian people and White people in the "last place (tied)" profile. They also did not show significant differences between Black people and Latinx people in any of the other profiles, or between the self and Asian people in the "second place (tied)" profile. These results map on to the results visually depicted in Figure 3 within the manuscript. See Table 4S for full results.

Table 1S

Between-Profile Comparison Model

	Self		**Asian**		**Black**		**Latinx**		**White**	
Contrast	*B*	*95% CI*	*B*	*95% CI*	*B*	*95% CI*	*B*	*95% CI*	*B*	*95% CI*
Second Place – Last Place	**-21.83**	-28.11 – -15.55	**-46.56**	-49.90 – -43.23	**-40.52**	-43.74 – -37.30	**-41.63**	-44.97 – -38.29	**-19.40**	-24.17 – -14.64
Third Compact – Last Place	**-7.94**	-13.11 – -2.76	**-22.83**	-25.58 – -20.08	**-19.24**	-21.90 – -16.59	**-23.26**	-26.02 – -20.51	**-14.96**	-18.89 – -11.04
Third Dispersed – Last Place	**-17.36**	-23.64 – -11.08	-3.19	-6.52 – 0.15	**-37.91**	-41.13 – -34.69	**-36.76**	-40.10 – -33.41	2.02	-2.74 – 6.78
Observations	506		506		506		506		506	
R^2 / R^2 adjusted	0.108 / 0.102		0.666 / 0.664		0.621 / 0.619		0.589 / 0.587		0.220 / 0.215	

Note. B shows unstandardized regression coefficient. Bolded B are significant at $p < .001$ level.

Table 2S

Between-Profile Contrasts

	Self		Asian		Black		Latinx		White	
Contrast	**Estimate**	***p***	**Estimate**	***p***	**Estimate**	***p***	**Estimate**	***p***	**Estimate**	***p***
Last Place – Second Place	21.83	<.001	46.56	<.001	40.52	<.001	41.63	<.001	19.40	<.001
Last Place - Third Compact	7.94	0.014	22.83	<.001	19.24	<.001	23.26	<.001	14.96	<.001
Last Place - Third Dispersed	17.36	0.000	3.19	0.239	37.91	<.001	36.76	<.001	-2.02	0.838
Second Place – Third Compact	-13.89	0.000	-23.73	<.001	-21.28	<.001	-18.37	<.001	-4.44	0.101
Second Place – Third Dispersed	-4.47	0.481	-43.38	<.001	-2.61	0.363	-4.87	0.019	-21.42	<.001
Third Compact – Third Dispersed	9.42	0.001	-19.64	<.001	18.67	<.001	13.50	<.001	-16.99	<.001

Table 3S

Within Profile Comparison Model

	Second Place (Tied) Model			**Third Place – Compact Model**			**Third Place – Dispersed Model**			**Last Place (Tied) Model**		
Predictors	*B*	*CI*	*p*	*B*	*CI*	*p*	*B*	*CI*	*p*	*B*	*CI*	*p*
(Intercept)	34.94	31.56 – 38.32	**<0.001**	48.83	47.24 – 50.43	**<0.001**	39.41	36.27 – 42.56	**<0.001**	56.77	53.47 – 60.07	**<0.001**
Asian - Self	-2.94	-7.50 – 1.62	0.206	6.90	4.71 – 9.09	**<0.001**	35.96	31.64 – 40.28	**<0.001**	21.79	17.15 – 26.44	**<0.001**
Black - Self	-13.39	-17.95 – -8.83	**<0.001**	-6.00	-8.19 – -3.81	**<0.001**	-15.25	-19.57 – -10.93	**<0.001**	5.31	0.67 – 9.95	**0.025**
Latinx - Self	-12.79	-17.35 – -8.23	**<0.001**	-8.31	-10.50 – -6.12	**<0.001**	-12.39	-16.71 – -8.07	**<0.001**	7.01	2.37 – 11.65	**0.003**
White - Self	26.40	21.84 – 30.96	**<0.001**	16.95	14.76 – 19.14	**<0.001**	43.35	39.03 – 47.67	**<0.001**	23.97	19.33 – 28.62	**<0.001**
Random Effects												
σ^2	228.77			160.76			205.30			217.30		
τ_{00}	22.06 $_{ID}$			10.45 $_{ID}$			12.23 $_{ID}$			2.66 $_{ID}$		
ICC	0.09			0.06			0.06			0.01		
N	85 $_{ID}$			258 $_{ID}$			85 $_{ID}$			78 $_{ID}$		
Observations	425			1290			425			390		
Marginal R^2 / Conditional R^2	0.456 / 0.503			0.330 / 0.371			0.736 / 0.751			0.292 / 0.300		

Table 4S

Between Profile Contrasts

	Second Place (Tied)		Third Place - Compact		Third Place - Dispersed		Last Place (Tied)	
Contrast	Estimate	*p*	Estimate	*p*	Estimate	*p*	Estimate	*p*
Self - Asian	2.94	0.711	-6.90	<.001	-35.96	<.001	-21.79	<.001
Self - Black	13.39	<.001	6.00	<.001	15.25	<.001	-5.31	0.165
Self - Latinx	12.79	<.001	8.31	<.001	12.39	<.001	-7.01	0.026
Self - White	-26.40	<.001	-16.95	<.001	-43.35	<.001	-23.97	<.001
Asian - Black	10.45	<.001	12.90	<.001	51.21	<.001	16.49	<.001
Asian - Latinx	9.85	<.001	15.21	<.001	48.35	<.001	14.78	<.001
Asian - White	-29.34	<.001	-10.05	<.001	-7.39	0.008	-2.18	0.888
Black - Latinx	-0.60	0.999	2.31	0.233	-2.86	0.691	-1.71	0.951
Black - White	-39.79	<.001	-22.95	<.001	-58.60	<.001	-18.67	<.001
Latinx - White	-39.19	<.001	-25.26	<.001	-55.74	<.001	-16.96	<.001

Lack of Moderation by Study Wave

As mentioned in the main manuscript, we also ran versions of our mixed-effects models that included an interaction between profile probabilities and wave; likewise, this model allowed the effect of covariates to vary by wave. As can be seen in Table 5S and Table 6S, neither the effects of profile probabilities, nor the effects of our covariates, varied over time for any outcome. Thus, in the manuscript, we report the results of the simplified models that remove the moderating effects of wave to ease the interpretation of our regression coefficients. That said, we report full model results for models including interactions with wave below.

Table 5S

The Effect of Profile Probabilities on Alt-Right Outcomes is not Moderated by Wave

	Alt-Right Ideology						Alt-Right Candidate		
	(Kam. et al., 2021)			(Cooley et al., 2024)					
Predictors	B	SE	p-value	B	SE	p-value	B	SE	p-value
Intercept	2.75	0.06	<.001	2.94	0.07	<.001	3.43	0.11	<.001
Prob. Third Place (*Compact*)	-0.66	0.21	.755	-0.26	0.23	.251	-0.56	0.35	.107
Prob. Third Place (*Dispersed*)	-0.31	0.26	.222	-0.39	0.28	.154	-0.95	0.42	.022
Prob. Second Place (Tied)	-0.74	0.25	<.001	-0.74	0.26	.005	-1.31	0.40	.001
Wave	-0.01	0.01	.588	-0.01	0.01	.230	-0.02	0.01	.161
Income	-0.03	0.05	.445	-0.02	0.04	.618	0.04	0.07	.585
Education	-0.25	0.07	<.001	-0.37	0.07	<.001	-0.59	0.11	<.001
Age	0.004	0.004	.381	0.003	0.005	.582	0.01	0.01	.065
Man (1: man; -1: else)	0.13	0.07	.052	0.06	0.07	.401	0.05	0.11	.613
Prob. Third Place (*Compact*) x Wave	-.024	0.03	.364	0.02	0.02	.415	-0.01	0.04	.833
Prob. Third Place (*Dispersed*) x Wave	-0.01	0.03	.782	0.02	0.03	.590	-0.02	0.06	.767
Prob. Second Place (Tied) x Wave	-0.03	0.04	.475	0.001	0.02	.955	-0.03	0.05	.533
Income x Wave	0.0002	0.01	.966	0.02	0.01	.964	-0.01	0.01	.111
Education x Wave	-0.01	0.01	.249	-.0007	0.01	.918	0.02	0.01	.229
Age x Wave	0.0001	0.001	.897	-0.0001	0.0004	.828	-0.0001	0.001	.937
Man x Wave	-0.0002	0.001	.980	-0.01	0.01	.102	0.01	0.01	.660

Note. Prob. stands for probability. Continuous predictors (probabilities, income, education, and age) were mean-centered prior to analyses; wave was centered around wave 1.

Table 6S

The Effect of Profile Probabilities on Trump-Related Outcomes is not Moderated by Wave

	DEI Ban Support			Trump Support			Likelihood Vote Trump		
	B	SE	p-value	B	SE	p-value	B	SE	p-value
Intercept	44.61	1.75	<.001	2.60	0.09	<.001	32.92	1.92	<.001
Prob. Third Place (*Compact*)	-7.59	5.76	.188	-0.44	0.30	.147	-8.50	6.30	.178
Prob. Third Place (*Dispersed*)	-13.67	6.93	.049	-0.01	0.36	.028	-18.78	7.60	.014
Prob. Second Place (Tied)	-24.77	6.63	<.001	-1.05	0.35	.003	-21.76	7.27	.003
Wave	0.53	0.20	.011	-0.01	0.01	.588	-0.19	0.25	.440
Income	1.73	1.11	.119	0.07	0.06	.209	1.67	1.21	.170
Education	-7.16	1.79	<.001	-0.44	0.10	<.001	-8.67	1.97	<.001
Age	0.30	0.11	.009	0.01	0.01	.047	0.28	0.13	.027
Man (1: man; -1: else)	3.43	1.79	.056	0.05	0.09	.630	1.29	1.97	.512
Prob. Third Place (*Compact*) x Wave	-0.81	0.81	.332	-0.01	0.04	.855	-0.26	0.84	.761
Prob. Third Place (*Dispersed*) x Wave	-0.34	0.84	.692	-0.05	0.05	.291	-1.69	0.96	.081
Prob. Second Place (Tied) x Wave	-0.26	0.84	.754	0.01	0.05	.753	-0.46	0.94	.630
Income x Wave	-0.03	0.14	.814	-0.003	0.01	.699	-0.25	0.14	.083
Education x Wave	0.003	0.21	.903	0.01	0.02	.416	0.41	0.27	.132
Age x Wave	-0.00003	0.01	.998	-0.001	0.001	.406	0.01	0.02	.655
Man x Wave	-0.05	0.20	.810	-0.01	0.01	.484	-0.19	0.25	.454

Note. Prob. stands for probability. Continuous predictors (probabilities, income, education, and age) were mean-centered prior to analyses; wave was centered around wave 1.

Comparable Results Using Pairwise Deletion for Missing Data (vs. Imputing Missing Data)

As mentioned in the main manuscript, we also replicated analyses using pairwise deletion to handle missing data (instead of imputation) to explore whether such an analysis decision affected our key predicted effects of profile probabilities on alt-right outcomes and Trump-relevant outcomes. As can be seen in Table 7S and Table 8S, results remained substantively unchanged regardless of how we handled missing data.

Table 7S

Effect of Profile on Alt-Right Outcomes, Dropping Non-Significant Interaction with Wave and Using Pairwise Deletion for Missing Data (vs. Imputing Missing Data)

	Alt-Right Ideology						Alt-Right Candidate		
	(Kam. et al., 2021)			(Cooley et al., 2024)					
Predictors	B	SE	p-value	B	SE	p-value	B	SE	p-value
Intercept	2.75	0.06	<.001	2.94	0.07	<.001	3.44	0.10	<.001
Prob. Third Place (*Compact*)	-0.11	0.21	.589	-0.21	0.22	.346	-0.58	0.34	.085
Prob. Third Place (*Dispersed*)	-0.33	0.25	.186	-0.34	0.27	.202	**-1.01**	**0.41**	**.013**
Prob. Second Place (Tied)	**-0.79**	**0.24**	**.001**	**-0.75**	**0.25**	**.004**	**-1.39**	**0.39**	**<.001**
Wave	-0.01	0.01	.457	-0.01	0.01	.243	-0.02	0.01	.091
Income	-0.03	0.04	.454	-0.02	0.04	.657	0.02	0.07	.812
Education	-0.27	0.07	<.001	-0.37	0.07	<.001	-0.57	0.11	<.001
Age	0.004	0.004	.352	0.002	0.004	.612	0.01	0.01	.061
Man (1: man; -1: else)	0.13	0.06	.047	0.03	0.07	.695	0.07	0.11	.524

Note. Kam. stands for Kamenowski. Prob. stands for probability. Bolded cells reflect the statistically significant effects of key profile predictors. Continuous predictors (probabilities, income, education, and age) were mean-centered prior to analyses; wave was centered around wave 1.

Table 8S

Effect of Profile Probabilities on Trump-Related Outcomes, Dropping Non-Significant Interaction with Wave and Using Pairwise Deletion for Missing Data (vs. Imputing Missing Data)

	DEI Ban Support			Trump Support			Likelihood Vote Trump		
	B	SE	p-value	B	SE	p-value	B	SE	p-value
Intercept	44.58	1.75	<.001	2.59	0.09	<.001	32.87	1.91	<.001
Prob. Third Place-*Compact*	-8.60	5.68	.131	-0.45	0.30	.135	-8.68	6.28	.168
Prob. Third Place-*Dispersed*	**-14.17**	**6.86**	**.039**	**-0.86**	**0.36**	**.018**	**-19.72**	**7.57**	**.009**
Prob. Second Place-Tied	**-24.03**	**6.56**	**<.001**	**-1.04**	**0.35**	**.003**	**-22.06**	**7.24**	**.002**
Wave	0.53	0.22	.017	-0.002	0.01	.835	-0.06	0.22	.790
Income	1.68	1.09	.125	0.07	0.06	.215	1.53	1.21	.206
Education	-7.18	1.78	<.001	-0.42	0.09	<.001	-8.45	1.97	<.001
Age	0.30	0.11	.008	0.01	0.01	.063	0.28	0.12	.026
Man (1: man; -1: else)	3.36	1.77	.058	0.03	0.09	.713	1.18	1.96	.546

Note. Prob. stands for probability. Bolded cells reflect the statistically significant effects of key profile predictors. Continuous predictors (probabilities, income, education, and age) were mean-centered prior to analyses; wave was centered around wave 1.

Visualizations of 3-Profile (Non-Selected) Model Versus 4-Profile Model

Within the manuscript we discuss why we selected the 4-profile model as the best-fitting model when applying LPA to our *within*- and *between-group* subjective status measure. That said, prior work and theory landed on a 3-profile model using the same measure, among the same demographic, 2 years prior to the present data collection (Cooley et al., 2024). Thus, we also explored the visualization of the 3-profile model here, given that the 3-profile model fit well, just not as well as the 4-profile model. As can be seen in Figure 1S, the results still yield the theorized "last place (tied)" profile (a consistency across samples and number of profiles). That said, in contrast to Cooley et al., 2024, the "last place (tied)" profile now reflects seeing the self as tied (rather than fully behind) one racially marginalized group in the U.S., namely, Black Americans. Likewise, instead of a "second place" and "third place" profile, as observed in prior work, we see two third place profiles, one that is relatively compact (much like the single "third place" profile observed in prior work) and one that is relatively dispersed. The former profile, which we call "third place-*compact*" in the present data, may reflect increased status threat (due to the perception of a tight status race) and the latter profile, which we call "third place-*dispersed*," looks much like the "second place" profile from prior work; likewise, due to its relatively dispersed nature, the "third place-*dispersed*" profile may reflect lower perceived status threat.

To further understand the difference between the 3-profile and 4-profile model in the present data, we also explored how participants in the 3-profile model (which looked much like prior work) were now recategorized into the better-fitting 4-profile model, if we categorize participants into their highest probability profile. As can be seen in Figure 4S, the "third place-*dispersed*" category was almost entirely reclassified into the "second place (tied)" profile in the

shift from a 3-profile to a 4-profile model. Notably, both here and in Cooley et al., 2024, the "second place" profile predicts the lowest support for alt right ideology. Likewise, in terms of our new outcomes, the "second place (tied)" profile also predicts the lowest support for DEI bans and President Trump in particular. As can be seen in Figure 2S, participants who originally fell in the "third place-*compact*" profile in the 3-profile model mostly stayed in that category in the 4-profile model, but 20-30% were resorted into either the "last place (tied)" profile or the "third place-*dispersed*" profile. Notably, no individuals who were placed in the "last place (tied)" profile within the 3-profile model were resorted to a different profile in the 4-profile model. This may suggest that this "last place (tied)" profile contains a particularly unique set of perceptions of one's personal perceived position *within*- and *between*- racial groups.

Figure 1S

Visual Depiction of (Non-Selected) 3-Profile Model Results



Figure 2S

Recategorizations in Shift from 3-Profile to 4-Profile Model



Classify-Analyze Approach with 3-Profile Model (Direct Replication of Cooley et al., 2024)

The indicator means for the 3-profile model appear in Table 9S and a visual of these means, mapped onto the subjective status measure of interest, appear in Figure 1S.

Table 9S

Summary of Indicator Means for Selected 3-Profile Model

Variable	**"Third Place-*Dispersed*" Profile** (*n* = 154) *M* [*95% CI*]	**"Third Place-*Compact*" Profile** (*n* = 296) *M* [*95% CI*]	**"Last Place (Tied)" Profile** (*n* = 56) *M* [*95% CI*]
Self	37.54 [33.46, 41.62]	48.14 [45.12, 51.16]	58.81 [51.79, 65.83]
White People	69.77 [65.22, 74.32]	68.15 [65.80, 70.50]	80.82 [77.33, 84.31]
Black People	23.03 [19.56, 26.50]	42.33 [39.68, 44.98]	65.05 [59.64, 70.46]
Asian People	49.18 [43.68, 54.68]	59.64 [57.23, 62.05]	77.52 [73.48, 81.56]
Latinx/Hispanic People	22.74 [19.74, 25.74]	41.71 [38.87, 44.55]	65.87 [60.44, 71.30]

Note. Means and standard errors for indicator variables across all profiles.

Longitudinal Models Using Profile to Predict Political Outcomes

After establishing participants' *within*- and *between-group* subjective status profile membership via LPA, we conducted longitudinal mixed-effects models that used profile membership to predict key political outcomes. In particular, participants were assigned to latent profiles based on their highest probability profile membership, as determined by the LPA, and profile was then used to predict political outcomes (i.e., a classify-analyze approach). Although this approach does not explicitly account for model classification uncertainty inherent in LPA, our LPA results showed relatively high certainty (entropy = .76). Prior simulation work has shown that when entropy is high (i.e., ≥ .75–.80), treating class membership as known yields results that are comparable to those obtained using uncertainty-adjusted methods (e.g., BCH/three-step; Clark & Muthén, 2009; Ferguson et al., 2022). Further minimizing concerns about the role of classification uncertainty in our predictive models, alternative analyses that

used participants' posterior probabilities of being classified into each profile as the focal predictor (rather than categorical profile placement) revealed comparably strong support for our hypotheses (see "Reviewer Requests" folder at our OSF link for related code/output).

All of that said, because Cooley et al. (2024) used the classify-analyze approach, we mirror this analysis strategy to ease comparisons across related publications and report the version of the models with profile membership as the predictor below.

Longitudinal Results

Replication and Extension to Longitudinal Context of 2024 U.S. Presidential Election: Alt-Right Outcomes

First, we tested whether we generally replicated the finding that subjective perceptions of falling in "last place (tied)" predicts the highest support for an unnamed, purportedly-local candidate with a platform that aligns with alt-right worldviews, as well as general support for alt-right ideology. Due to the longitudinal nature of these data, we were further interested in whether these effects became stronger as the election neared.

To test these hypotheses, we fit a series of linear mixed-effects models in R predicting each of our three alt-right outcomes from profile, wave, and their interaction. This allowed us to test whether the relation between profile membership and alt-right outcomes changed over time. Our models nested observations within participant and specified a random slope for the effect of wave (coded from 1-5). Profile, as measured at wave 1, was indicator-coded such that the reference group was the "last place (tied)" profile (meaning its effect is captured by the intercept) and the other two profiles were dummy coded in the model. Aligned with Cooley et al. (2024), we controlled for age, objective status (i.e., income and education) and gender (1: man; -1: else) so that we could isolate the potential effects of *subjective* status. Continuous predictors (income,

education, and age) were mean-centered prior to analyses. Each of our control variables were initially also allowed to interact with wave, so we could control for their effects over time.

Notably, for none of our outcomes was the effect of profile moderated by wave of the study. For this reason, the results of simplified models without interaction terms with wave are reported below.

Fictional Alt-Right Candidate. First, as can be seen in Table 10S, we found that White Americans in the "last place (tied)" profile reported descriptively, and statistically significantly, higher support for a political candidate whose platform aligned with alt-right ideology, followed by the "third place-*compact*" profile, and the "third place-*dispersed*" profile, which had the lowest alt-right candidate support. In addition to the model-estimated effects, we also conducted pairwise comparisons of the mean support expressed by White Americans in each pair of profiles using the "emmeans" package in R. These contrasts apply Tukey's method for *p*-value adjustment to account for multiple testing making them a more conservative estimate of statistical significance than the overall mixed-effects model results. As can also be seen via the subscripts in Table 11S, both the "last place (tied)" profile and the "third place-*compact*" profile supported the candidate statistically significantly more than the "third place-*dispersed*" profile, but the "last place (tied)" profile and "third place-*compact*" profile did not significantly differ from one another in support for the candidate when using this more conservative test. That said, the "last place (tied)" profile reported, descriptively, the highest support and *did* significantly differ from the "third place-*compact*" profile in the model itself as seen in Table 10S.

Alt-Right Ideology (Measured Via Two Separate Scales). Next, partially consistent with hypotheses, and replicating Cooley et al. (2024), White Americans in the "last place (tied)" profile descriptively reported the highest support for viewpoints that align with alt-right ideology

(via both scales assessing this construct), followed by the "third place-*compact*" profile, and then the "third place-*dispersed*" profile; although the "last place (tied)" profile and the "third place-*compact*" profile did not significantly differ from one another within the model (see Table 10S). Again, as a more conservative test, we conducted Tukey-adjusted pairwise contrasts to compare mean support for alt-right ideology between the profiles. As can also be seen via the subscripts in Table 11S, both the "last place (tied)" profile and the "third place-*compact*" profile were statistically significantly higher in alt-right support (via both alt-right scales) than the "third place-*dispersed*" profile, but the "last place (tied)" profile and "third place-*compact*" profile did not significantly differ in alt-right support via either scale. That said, the "last place (tied)" profile was descriptively highest in support for viewpoints that align with the alt-right as predicted, and as found in Cooley et al. (2024).

In sum, the findings above generally replicated prior work that has linked feeling "last place (tied)" to more support for alt-right ideology among White Americans but extended these findings to the unique historical context of the 2024 U.S. presidential election.

Extension: DEI Ban Support and Trump-Relevant Outcomes

DEI Ban Support. When predicting support for DEI bans, the results of the mixed-effects model, as can be seen in Table 10S, revealed that the "last place (tied)" profile was both descriptively and statistically significantly higher in support for DEI bans as compared to the "third place-*compact*" profile and the "third place-*dispersed*" profile, which expressed the lowest DEI ban support. As with our other outcomes, we also conducted Tukey-adjusted pairwise comparisons between each pair of means. These tests revealed that the "last place (tied)" profile and the "third place-*compact*" profile were statistically significantly higher in support for DEI bans than the "third place-*dispersed*" profile, but the "last place (tied)" profile and "third place-

compact" profile did not significantly differ via this more conservative testing strategy (see Table 11S).

Table 10S

Effect of Profile on Alt-Right Outcomes, Dropping Non-Significant Interaction with Wave

	AR Generic Candidate			AR Support (Kamenowski et al., 2021)			AR Support (Cooley et al., 2024)			DEI Ban Support		
	B	SE	p-value	B	SE	p-value	B	SE	p-value	B	SE	p-value
Intercept	**4.34**	**0.31**	**<.001**	**3.00**	**0.19**	**<.001**	**3.33**	**0.20**	**<.001**	**59.28**	**5.14**	**<.001**
Profile1 (third place-*dispersed* vs. last place)	**-1.53**	**0.36**	**<.001**	**-0.63**	**0.22**	**.005**	**-0.74**	**0.24**	**.002**	**-26.65**	**6.03**	**<.001**
Profile2 (third place-*compact* vs. last place)	**-0.74**	**0.33**	**.026**	**-0.10**	**0.21**	**.616**	**-0.28**	**0.22**	**.205**	**-11.23**	**5.59**	**.045**
Wave	-0.02	0.02	.235	-0.007	0.008	.381	-0.008	0.007	.264	0.56	0.20	0.005
Income	0.005	0.06	.939	-0.03	0.04	.468	-0.02	0.04	.607	1.45	1.08	0.180
Education	-0.55	0.11	<.001	-0.27	0.06	.333	-0.37	0.07	<.001	-6.93	1.76	<.001
Age	0.01	0.007	.076	0.003	0.004	.408	0.002	0.004	.667	0.28	0.11	.013
Man (1: man; -1: else)	0.06	0.10	.570	0.119	0.06	.649	0.03	0.07	.711	3.25	1.75	.064

Note. Bolded rows reflect the effects of indicator-coded profile, the IV of key interest. AR stands for alt-right.

Table 11S

Estimated Marginal Means and Tukey-Adjusted Pairwise Comparisons for Models Predicting Alt-Right Outcomes from Subjective Status Profile Membership

Dependent Variable	**"Third Place-*Dispersed*" Profile** *M* [95% CI]	**"Third Place-*Compact*" Profile** *M* [95% CI]	**"Last Place (Tied)" Profile** *M* [95% CI]
Alt-Right Candidate Support	2.81a [2.44, 3.18]	3.59b [3.33, 3.86]	**4.34b [3.73, 4.94]**
Alt-Right Ideology (Kam. et al., 2021)	2.37a [2.15, 2.60]	2.90b [2.73, 3.06]	**3.00b [2.62, 3.38]**
Alt-Right Ideology (Cooley et al., 2024)	2.59a [2.34, 2.83]	3.05b [2.87, 3.22]	**3.33b [2.93, 3.73]**
Support DEI Bans	32.60a [26.50, 38.80]	48.00b [43.60, 52.50]	**59.30b [49.20, 69.40]**

Note. Kam. stands for Kamenowski. The bolded cells indicate the highest mean for each outcome. The letter next to the estimated marginal means indicate which means are significantly different ($p < .05$) from one another. When means share a letter (e.g., both have an "a") then these two means do not significantly differ from one another. When means do not share a letter (e.g., one is "a" and one is "b") then these two means significantly differ from one another.

Trump Support and Trump Voting Likelihood (Pre-Election). Next, we tested whether White Americans who saw themselves in "last place (tied)" showed more support for Trump and reported a higher likelihood of voting for Trump as the election neared (waves 1-3). To test this, we fit comparable linear mixed-effects model in R as we ran when predicting alt-right outcomes and DEI ban support. However, this time, survey wave was coded 1-3 only (i.e., the waves at which Trump support and likelihood of voting for Trump were measured). In all other respects, these models mirrored those described above when predicting alt-right-relevant outcomes and DEI ban support.

As can be seen in Table 12S, White Americans in the "last place (tied)" profile reported the greatest, and statistically significantly higher, Trump support and likelihood of voting for Trump, leading up to the election, than White Americans in either the "third place-*compact*" or "third place-*dispersed*" profiles. Moreover, Tukey-adjusted pairwise contrasts also indicated that those in the "last place (tied)" profile reported significantly more support for Trump than White

Americans in either the "third place-*compact*" profile or the "third place-*dispersed*" profile, who showed the lowest support for Trump (see Table 13S).

Table 12S

Effect of Profile on Trump-Related Outcomes, Dropping Non-Significant Interaction with Wave

	Trump Support			Likelihood Vote Trump		
	B	SE	p-value	B	SE	p-value
Intercept	**3.39**	**0.27**	**<.001**	**49.72**	**5.69**	**<.001**
Profile1 (third place-*dispersed* vs. last place)	**-1.19**	**0.32**	**<.001**	**-26.72**	**6.68**	**<.001**
Profile2 (third place-*compact* vs. last place)	**-0.72**	**0.30**	**.014**	**-14.88**	**6.18**	**.016**
Wave	-0.003	0.01	.843	-0.07	0.28	.798
Income	0.06	0.06	.293	1.26	1.20	.292
Education	-0.40	0.09	<.001	-7.90	1.95	<.001
Age	0.01	0.01	.070	0.28	0.12	.022
Man (1: man; -1: else)	0.04	0.09	.690	1.23	1.94	.524

Note. Bolded rows reflect the effects of indicator-coded profile, the IV of key interest.

Table 13S

Estimated Marginal Means and Tukey-Adjusted Pairwise Comparisons for Models Predicting Trump-Related Outcomes from Subjective Status Profile Membership

Dependent Variable	**"Third Place-*Dispersed*" Profile** *M* [95% CI]	**"Third Place-*Compact*" Profile** *M* [95% CI]	**"Last Place (Tied)" Profile** *M* [95% CI]
Trump Support	2.19a [1.87, 2.52]	2.66a [2.43, 2.90]	**3.39b [2.85, 3.92]**
Likelihood Vote Trump	23.00a [16.20, 29.80]	34.80b [30.00, 39.70]	**49.70c [38.50, 60.90]**

Note. The bolded cells indicate the highest mean for each outcome. The letter next to the estimated marginal means indicate which means are significantly different ($p < .05$) from one another. When means share a letter (e.g., both have an "a") then these two means do not significantly differ from one another. When means do not share a letter (e.g., one is "a" and one is "b") then these two means significantly differ from one another.

Actual Vote for Trump (Day After Election)

Finally, we predicted self-reported voting behavior, as measured at wave 4, completed the day after the election. As a reminder $N = 377$ participants completed wave 4. A chi-square test for independence was conducted to examine the relationship between profile ("third place-

dispersed" vs. "third place-*compact*" vs. "last place (tied)") and self-reported voting behavior (Trump vs. another candidate) among the $N = 342$ participants who reported that they voted in the U.S. presidential election at wave 4 ($N = 35$ reported that they did not vote). The results revealed that profile was statistically significantly associated with vote choice, χ^2 (2) = 9.66, p = .008. As can be seen in Figure 3S, among the people who voted, falling in the "last place (tied)" profile was associated with the highest probability of voting for Trump (vs. another candidate) followed by the "third place-*compact*" profile. Those in the "third place-*dispersed*" profile showed the lowest probability of voting for Trump.

Figure 3S

Proportion of Individuals Who Voted for Trump by Profile | N = 342



Note. These values are calculated with non-imputed data. Numbers within bars are sample sizes per cell.

Missing Data Analyses

Models below show results from logistic regressions predicting missingness (0 = non-missing, 1 = missing) on key observed data, including probabilities of profile assignment, support for Trump at wave 1 (to account for political lean), and alt-right beliefs at wave 1 (as measured by Cooley et al., 2024) to ensure missingness on other DVs was not related to a key variable of interest), age, education, income, and gender. See Tables 14S-18S.

Table 14S

Predicting Missingness in Alt-Right Ideology (Cooley et al., 2024) at T3-T5

	Missing Alt R T3			**Missing Alt R T4**			**Missing Alt R T5**		
Predictors	*Odds Ratios*	*CI*	*p*	*Odds Ratios*	*CI*	*p*	*Odds Ratios*	*CI*	*p*
(Intercept)	2.16	0.49 – 9.51	0.304	3.37	1.15 – 9.95	**0.027**	4.86	1.90 – 12.63	**0.001**
Prob. Second Place (Tied)	0.90	0.31 – 2.63	0.852	1.04	0.48 – 2.30	0.913	0.58	0.29 – 1.15	0.121
Prob. Third Place (*Compact*)	0.55	0.22 – 1.48	0.223	0.74	0.37 – 1.50	0.398	0.66	0.36 – 1.19	0.165
Prob. Third Place (*Dispersed*)	1.18	0.43 – 3.32	0.752	0.94	0.42 – 2.12	0.888	0.55	0.27 – 1.13	0.108
t1 Supp Trump	1.07	0.92 – 1.23	0.373	1.01	0.91 – 1.12	0.809	0.97	0.89 – 1.06	0.479
income	0.87	0.72 – 1.06	0.172	0.97	0.84 – 1.11	0.635	0.92	0.82 – 1.04	0.184
education	0.82	0.60 – 1.11	0.196	0.93	0.75 – 1.16	0.541	0.98	0.81 – 1.19	0.836
age	0.96	0.94 – 0.98	**<0.001**	0.96	0.95 – 0.97	**<0.001**	0.98	0.97 – 0.99	**<0.001**
man	1.08	0.80 – 1.45	0.616	1.11	0.90 – 1.38	0.336	1.11	0.92 – 1.34	0.272
Observations	506			506			506		
R^2 Tjur	0.078			0.097			0.047		

Table 15S

Predicting Missingness in Alt-Right Ideology (Kamenowski et al., 2021) at T3-T5

	Missing Kam. Alt R T3			**Missing Kam. Alt R T4**			**Missing Kam Alt R T5**		
Predictors	*Odds Ratios*	*CI*	*p*	*Odds Ratios*	*CI*	*p*	*Odds Ratios*	*CI*	*p*
(Intercept)	2.16	0.49 – 9.51	0.304	3.37	1.15 – 9.95	**0.027**	4.86	1.90 – 12.63	**0.001**
Prob. Second Place (Tied)	0.90	0.31 – 2.63	0.852	1.04	0.48 – 2.30	0.913	0.58	0.29 – 1.15	0.121
Prob. Third Place (*Compact*)	0.55	0.22 – 1.48	0.223	0.74	0.37 – 1.50	0.398	0.66	0.36 – 1.19	0.165
Prob. Third Place (*Dispersed*)	1.18	0.43 – 3.32	0.752	0.94	0.42 – 2.12	0.888	0.55	0.27 – 1.13	0.108
t1 Supp Trump	1.07	0.92 – 1.23	0.373	1.01	0.91 – 1.12	0.809	0.97	0.89 – 1.06	0.479
income	0.87	0.72 – 1.06	0.172	0.97	0.84 – 1.11	0.635	0.92	0.82 – 1.04	0.184
education	0.82	0.60 – 1.11	0.196	0.93	0.75 – 1.16	0.541	0.98	0.81 – 1.19	0.836
age	0.96	0.94 – 0.98	**<0.001**	0.96	0.95 – 0.97	**<0.001**	0.98	0.97 – 0.99	**<0.001**
man	1.08	0.80 – 1.45	0.616	1.11	0.90 – 1.38	0.336	1.11	0.92 – 1.34	0.272
Observations	506			506			506		
R^2 Tjur	0.078			0.097			0.047		

Table 16S

Predicting Missingness in Anti-DEI Attitudes at T3-T5

	Missing Anti DEI T3			**Missing Anti DEI T4**			**Missing Anti DEI T5**		
Predictors	*Odds Ratios*	*CI*	*p*	*Odds Ratios*	*CI*	*p*	*Odds Ratios*	*CI*	*p*
(Intercept)	2.85	0.58 – 14.22	0.197	4.52	1.41 – 14.76	**0.012**	4.83	1.75 – 13.57	**0.003**
Prob. Second Place (Tied)	0.90	0.31 – 2.62	0.844	1.04	0.47 – 2.30	0.921	0.58	0.29 – 1.15	0.121
Prob. Third Place (*Compact*)	0.55	0.22 – 1.47	0.216	0.74	0.37 – 1.50	0.390	0.66	0.36 – 1.19	0.165
Prob. Third Place (*Dispersed*)	1.20	0.44 – 3.38	0.728	0.96	0.43 – 2.16	0.919	0.55	0.27 – 1.14	0.108
t1 Supp Trump	1.14	0.93 – 1.40	0.206	1.09	0.93 – 1.27	0.275	0.97	0.85 – 1.10	0.614
t1 AltR	0.88	0.67 – 1.15	0.370	0.88	0.71 – 1.07	0.209	1.00	0.84 – 1.19	0.975
income	0.86	0.70 – 1.05	0.138	0.96	0.83 – 1.10	0.532	0.92	0.82 – 1.04	0.187
education	0.81	0.60 – 1.10	0.179	0.92	0.74 – 1.15	0.479	0.98	0.81 – 1.19	0.839
age	0.96	0.94 – 0.98	**<0.001**	0.96	0.95 – 0.97	**<0.001**	0.98	0.97 – 0.99	**<0.001**
man	1.09	0.81 – 1.46	0.586	1.12	0.90 – 1.39	0.314	1.11	0.92 – 1.34	0.272
Observations	506			506			506		
R^2 Tjur	0.081			0.100			0.047		

Table 17S

Predicting Missingness in Alt-Right Candidate Support at T3-T5

	Missing Alt-R Cand T3			**Missing Alt-R Cand T4**			**Missing Alt-R Cand T5**		
Predictors	*Odds Ratios*	*CI*	*p*	*Odds Ratios*	*CI*	*p*	*Odds Ratios*	*CI*	*p*
(Intercept)	2.85	0.58 – 14.22	0.197	4.52	1.41 – 14.76	**0.012**	4.83	1.75 – 13.57	**0.003**
Prob. Second Place (Tied)	0.90	0.31 – 2.62	0.844	1.04	0.47 – 2.30	0.921	0.58	0.29 – 1.15	0.121
Prob. Third Place (*Compact*)	0.55	0.22 – 1.47	0.216	0.74	0.37 – 1.50	0.390	0.66	0.36 – 1.19	0.165
Prob. Third Place (*Dispersed*)	1.20	0.44 – 3.38	0.728	0.96	0.43 – 2.16	0.919	0.55	0.27 – 1.14	0.108
t1 Supp Trump	1.14	0.93 – 1.40	0.206	1.09	0.93 – 1.27	0.275	0.97	0.85 – 1.10	0.614
t1 AltR	0.88	0.67 – 1.15	0.370	0.88	0.71 – 1.07	0.209	1.00	0.84 – 1.19	0.975
income	0.86	0.70 – 1.05	0.138	0.96	0.83 – 1.10	0.532	0.92	0.82 – 1.04	0.187
education	0.81	0.60 – 1.10	0.179	0.92	0.74 – 1.15	0.479	0.98	0.81 – 1.19	0.839
age	0.96	0.94 – 0.98	**<0.001**	0.96	0.95 – 0.97	**<0.001**	0.98	0.97 – 0.99	**<0.001**
man	1.09	0.81 – 1.46	0.586	1.12	0.90 – 1.39	0.314	1.11	0.92 – 1.34	0.272
Observations	506			506			506		
R^2 Tjur	0.081			0.100			0.047		

Table 18S

Predicting Missingness in Trump Support & Likelihood of Voting for Trump at T3

	Missing Supp Trump T3			Missing Vote Likelihood Trump T3		
Predictors	*Odds Ratios*	*CI*	*p*	*Odds Ratios*	*CI*	*p*
(Intercept)	2.74	0.56 – 13.67	0.216	2.95	0.60 – 14.70	0.182
Prob. Second Place (Tied)	0.82	0.29 – 2.37	0.715	0.84	0.30 – 2.43	0.751
Prob. Third Place (*Compact*)	0.53	0.21 – 1.40	0.183	0.55	0.22 – 1.47	0.218
Prob. Third Place (*Dispersed*)	1.11	0.41 – 3.11	0.837	1.09	0.40 – 3.07	0.860
t1 AltR	1.00	0.83 – 1.20	0.992	1.00	0.83 – 1.20	0.983
income	0.88	0.72 – 1.06	0.190	0.88	0.72 – 1.06	0.182
education	0.80	0.59 – 1.08	0.152	0.81	0.60 – 1.09	0.164
age	0.96	0.94 – 0.98	**<0.001**	0.96	0.94 – 0.98	**<0.001**
man	1.08	0.80 – 1.45	0.614	1.09	0.81 – 1.47	0.553
Observations	506			506		
R^2 Tjur	0.076			0.080		

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